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Abstract: In the last two decades, feed-in tariffs (FIT) and renewable portfolio standards 
(RPS)  have  emerged  as  two  of  the  most  popular  policies  for  supporting  renewable 
electricity (RES-E) generation in the developed world. A few studies have assessed their 
effectiveness,  but  most  do  not  account  for  policy  design  features  and  market 
characteristics that influence policy strength. In this paper, we employ 1992-2008 panel 
data to conduct the first analysis of the effectiveness of FIT policies in promoting solar 
photovoltaic (PV) and onshore wind power development in 26 European Union countries. 
We  develop  a  new  indicator  for  FIT  strength  that  captures  variability  in  tariff  size, 
contract  duration,  digression  rate,  electricity  price,  and  electricity  generation  cost  to 
estimate the resulting return on investment. We then regress this indicator on added 
RES-E capacity using a fixed effects specification. We find that FIT policies have driven 
solar  PV  and  onshore  wind  capacity  development  in  the  EU.  However,  this  effect  is 
overstated without controls for country characteristics and may be concealed without 
accounting for the unique design of each policy. We provide empirical evidence that the 
interaction of policy design and market dynamics are more important determinants of 
RES-E development than policy enactment alone.  
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1  Introduction 
Many national, regional, and local governments have passed regulations to encourage 
renewable  electricity  (RES-E)  generation  in  the  last  two  decades.  RES-E  generation 
sources  include  biomass,  geothermal  energy,  hydroelectric  power,  wave  power,  tidal 
power,  solar  photovoltaic,  solar  thermal  and  wind  power.  Motivations  for  regulatory 
support of RES-E generation include rising concerns over climate change and pollution, 
national  security  risks  associated  with  fossil  fuels,  and  a  desire  to  increase  the 
competitiveness of new energy sources in markets traditionally dominated by fossil fuels. 
1.1  Varieties of renewable energy policy design 
RES-E policies can be characterized along two regulatory dimensions.  First, policies may 
regulate either the price of renewable electricity or the quantity produced, a distinction 
most famously analyzed by Weitzman (1974). Second, policies may support investment in 
RES-E  capacity  or  directly  subsidize  generation  (Haas  et  al.  2004,  Haas  et  al.  2008, 
Menanteau et al. 2003).  Policies are categorized along these dimensions in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Renewable energy support policies 
  Price  Quantity 
Investment 
  Investment subsidies 
  Tax credits 
  Low interest/soft loans 
  Tendering systems for 
investment grants 
Generation 
  Fixed price feed-in tariffs 
  Premium feed-in tariffs 
  Renewable energy portfolio 
standards 
  Tendering systems for long 
term contracts 
  Table modified from Haas et al. (2008). 
 
Two of the most popular policy types for encouraging RES-E generation in the developed 
world are feed-in tariffs (FIT)  and quotas, often  called renewable portfolio standards 
(RPS).  RPS is a form of command-and-control quantity regulation that requires utilities to 
generate  a  certain  portion  of  their  electricity  from  renewable  sources.  It  tends  to 
promote  the  lowest-cost  RES-E  technologies,  as  utilities  can  typically  choose  from  a 
variety of technologies to meet their quota requirement.  In contrast, a FIT is a form of  
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price  regulation  under  which  producers  of  RES-E  sign  a  contract  that  increases  the 
payment they receive for each kilowatt-hour generated. It provides a technology-specific 
subsidy  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of  RES-E  generation  relative  to  conventional 
generation  sources.    The  effect  is  often  to  equalize  attractiveness  among  energy 
technologies with different production costs.  Despite these differences in design, FIT and 
RPS policies are similar in that (1) they are intended to promote RES-E generation beyond 
what would have occurred otherwise and (2) the costs of doing so are typically born by 
the end user.    
The  FIT  is  the  most  popular  RES-E  support  scheme  in  European  countries. 
However, there is considerable variety in the design of individual FIT policies (Couture 
and Gagnon 2010).  This implies that each FIT is unique in structure and, as this paper will 
show, in the incentive it provides.   
FIT policies may differ in one or more of the following characteristics: 
  Fixed-price vs. premium tariff: A FIT may be structured as either a fixed-price tariff, 
which guarantees that electricity generators can sell their electricity to the grid at a 
set price, or a premium tariff, which adds a bonus to the wholesale market price 
received by generators. In the EU, Denmark and Cyprus are the only countries that 
have implemented a premium tariff.  All other countries with a FIT employ the fixed-
price design. 
  Cost allocation: Under a FIT, the generator signs a contract that entitles it to feed 
electricity  into  the  grid  prior  to  any  other  conventional  source.  The  difference 
between the tariff and the actual market price is in most countries re-distributed 
among end-users or paid from state budgets.  To avoid overburdening end-users, 
Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands cap the 
total tariff value available each year.  
  Contract duration: The duration over which the FIT is paid to the generator varies 
between policies. There is often a tradeoff between duration and magnitude. For 
example, the Netherlands provides a relatively high tariff for a contract duration of 10 
years only, while Luxembourg provides a lower tariff for 20 years.   
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  Applicable energy technologies: FIT policies in most countries support all renewable 
electricity  technologies  with  the  exception  of  large-scale  hydroelectric  power. 
However,  some  countries  restrict  FIT  applicability  to  specific  technologies.  For 
example,  France  supports wind power, biomass, and solar PV only, whereas Italy 
focuses entirely on solar PV.  
  Tariff amount: The tariff received by generators may differ in size between countries 
and energy technologies.  Factors that influence the size of the tariff provided by a 
policy include generation cost, location, system size, receiving party, and the purpose 
of the host building.   
  Digression rate: Many FIT policies have a built-in digression rate, a mechanism for 
reducing the tariff value according to the number of years after policy enactment a 
FIT contract is signed. The goal is to slowly adjust the incentive provided by the FIT, to 
both adapt to and incentivize cost reductions in RES-E generation over time.   
Several other types of RES-E policies have emerged in the EU and U.S. in the last two 
decades as well.  Six EU countries have introduced tradable green certificate systems.  
Seven  countries  have  introduced  tax  incentives  or  investment  grants.  Four  have 
implemented a tendering system, a type of quantity regulation.  Denmark and Italy also 
augment their RES-E policies with a net-metering policy.  In the U.S., quantity regulation 
in the form of renewable portfolio standards has emerged as the dominant policy tool at 
the state level, with 29 states and the District of Colombia implementing an RPS by 2011 
(DSIRE 2011; Palmer et al. 2011). Worldwide, more than 80 countries employ policies to 
promote RES-E (REN21 2010). 
1.2  The question of RES-E development and FIT effectiveness in Europe 
Between  1990  and  2011,  23  EU  member  countries  implemented  a  feed-in  tariff  to 
support solar PV or onshore wind development. Table 2 displays the years of enactment 
for major RES-E policy types in Europe. Policy enactment is skewed over time: some 
countries such as Germany and Italy adopted RES-E policies very early, but most have 






Table 2: Years of RES-E policy enactment in EU 27 countries from 1990 to 2011 
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Each row represents a policy type.  Italics designate premium FIT policies.  (1) Fixed or premium FIT for 
onshore  wind,  (2)  fixed  or  premium  FIT  for  solar  PV,  (3)  first  cap  introduced,  (4)  quota  scheme,  (5) 
tendering scheme, (6) tax incentive/investment grant. Source: Res-legal (2011), Ragwitz et al. (2011), and 
REN21 (2010). 
 
During  this  same  time  period,  RES-E  generation  capacity  in  EU  27  countries  has 
developed rapidly and unevenly. Figure 1 displays trends in cumulative non-hydro RES-E 
generation capacity in EU countries. Previous studies have examined these dividing paths 
using  an  array  of  macroeconomic,  ecological  and  socio-economic  factors.  A  few 
quantitative studies have assessed the effectiveness of RES-E policies, but this is an area 
of surprisingly sparse research. 
 
Figure 1: Total non-hydroelectric RES-E electricity generation capacity in EU 27 countries  
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1.3  Research question and contribution 
In  light  of  the  differences  in  both  RES-E  development  and  FIT  enactment  between 
countries and over time, a key question for policymakers is whether FIT policies have 
actually increased RES-E generation capacity beyond what would have occurred in their 
absence.  In  this  paper,  we  develop  the  first  rigorous  econometric  analysis  of  FIT 
effectiveness in Europe to date. The primary contribution of our paper is to develop an 
indicator for the strength of FIT policies that takes into account differences in policy 
design.  Specifically, we capture heterogeneity in tariff size, contract duration, digression 
rate, electricity wholesale price, and electricity generation cost to construct a measure of 
the  return-on-investment  (ROI)  provided  by  each  policy.  We  develop  a  technology-
specific  fixed-effects  regression  model  to  test  the  significance  of  this  indicator  using 
historical data on solar PV and onshore wind power in the EU.  The model controls for 
fixed  country-level  characteristics  that  may  be  correlated  with  both  policy 
implementation and RES-E development. 
This paper improves and expands on the existing literature in three key ways.  
First, it focuses on a policy type and a region that have been largely ignored in previous 
econometric studies.  Second, it accounts for unique policy design features that have 
been  largely  ignored  in  econometric  analyses  of  RES-E  policies  in  general.    Third,  it 
provides a detailed literature review and summary of trends in econometric RES-E policy 
analysis, with a focus on methodology. 
We find that FIT policies are a major driver of solar PV and onshore wind capacity 
development.  However,  this  effect  is  overstated  without  controlling  for  country 
characteristics and may not be observed at all without accounting for the unique design 
of each policy. 
The  remainder  of  the  article  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  two  provides  a 
literature review on econometric RES-E policy assessments with a specific focus on the 
models  used.  Section  three  presents  our  empirical  framework,  including  our  new 
indicator  that  quantifies  ROI  for  FIT  policies,  regression  specification,  selection  of 
controls, and data. Section four provides regression results that we discuss in section 
five.   
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2  Literature Review 
Literature on the role of policy in the development of renewable energy sources is vast. 
However, the majority of research takes a normative or descriptive approach to outlining 
the factors that influence RES development. Several case studies (del Río González and 
Gual 2007, del Río González 2008, Haas et al. 2011, Lesser and Su 2008, Lipp 2007) and 
other qualitative evaluation techniques have suggested that FIT policies are an important 
element in explaining the success of RES-E development in Europe. 
Rigorous empirical studies of renewable energy policy effectiveness are less common. 
Studies  with  methods  or  results  relevant  to  our  analysis  are  summarized  in  Table  3. 
However, to our knowledge, the present paper is the first study to apply econometric 
methods to the problem of FIT effectiveness is Europe. 
Most econometric studies assessing the effectiveness of renewable energy policies 
to  date  have  focused  on  state-level  policies  in  the  United  States,  particularly  RPS. 
However, several lessons can be learned from recent developments in the study of RPS 
policies and applied to an analysis of FIT policies in Europe. Studies that examine the 
drivers of RES-E development can be divided into three groups: (1) those that employ 
cross-sectional  specifications,  (2)  those  that  use  panel  data  to  control  for  state-level 
characteristics,  and  (3)  more  nuanced  analyses  that  use  complex  dependent  and/or 
independent variables to articulate differences in policy design or policy responsiveness. 
The first group (Menz and Vachon 2006, Adelaja and Hailu 2008) employs pooled 
cross-section  regressions  to  look  at  the  impact  of  policy  variables  (usually  a  binary 
variable or simple numeric indicator such as the dollar value of a tax credit) on RES-E 
capacity development. Alegappan et al. (2011) rely on descriptive statistics only. These 
studies find a strong positive correlation between RPS (and some other policies) and 
renewable energy development. However, their specifications do not control for state-
level  characteristics  or  time  trends  that  may  be  correlated  with  both  policy 
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The second group (Carley 2009, Delmas 2011, Marques et al. 2010, Shrimali and 
Kneifel 2011) provides empirical evidence to support this concern.  These studies use 
fixed-effects regression models or other strategies to reduce omitted variables bias from 
state characteristics that are correlated with both policy implementation and renewable  
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energy deployment. They suggest a less certain relationship between RPS policies and 
deployment. For example, Carley (2009) finds that RPS implementation does not predict 
the percentage of energy generation from renewable sources, though the number of 
years a state maintains an RPS is a significant determinant of total renewable energy 
capacity development.  Shrimali and Kneifel (2011) find that RPS policies actually appear 
to reduce the penetration of some RES-E technologies and overall RES-E capacity, while 
they increase the penetration of others.  These results call into question the effectiveness 
of RPS policies once non-policy state characteristics have been controlled for. 
The third group (Marques et al. 2011, Yin and Powers 2009) uses more nuanced 
model specifications to better capture the complexity of RES-E development.  Marques et 
al.  (2011)  apply  a  quantile  regression  approach  to  analyze  the  drivers  of  renewable 
energy  deployment  in  European  Union  countries,  finding  that  responsiveness  to 
economic and social drivers varies in magnitude, significance, and sometimes direction 
between  countries  with  different  initial  levels  of  renewable  energy  penetration. 
However, Marques et al. (2011) do not incorporate any policy variables. Yin and Powers 
(2009) make a key contribution to the debate by addressing policy design heterogeneity 
in state-level RPS policies in the U.S.  They develop a new quantitative measure of RPS 
stringency that takes into account policy design features that differ by state.  Applying 
this new measure within a fixed-effects specification, they find that RPS policies have had 
a significant and positive effect on renewable energy deployment.  Most importantly, 
they verify that this effect would not be  observed if differences in policy design are 
ignored, as done in studies that use binary policy variables only. 
The two primary analyses of RES-E development drivers in Europe are provided by 
Marques et al. (2010; 2011).  In the first paper, they use a panel FEVD model on a sample 
of 24 European countries from 1990 to 2006 to estimate the effect of general political 
and  socioeconomic  factors  on  the  renewable  energy  percentage  of  total  electricity 
generation.  The empirical approach of the second paper was discussed above.  These 
papers find that the fossil fuel industry lobby is a negative driver of development, while 
energy  dependency,  energy  consumption,  and  the  European  Union  Directive 
2001/77/EC—which  created  mandatory  RES-E  targets  for  EU  member  countries—are  
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positive drivers. However, neither of these studies specifically assesses the impact of 
individual policy types.  
3  Empirical Framework and Data 
The  primary  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  FIT  policies  in 
promoting renewable electricity capacity development in the EU.  
Leveraging  lessons  learned  from  the  above  studies,  we  make  three  key 
contributions. First, we apply a rigorous econometric framework to the problem of FIT 
effectiveness in Europe. We assemble country-specific data at a technology-specific level 
for solar PV and onshore wind capacity for the period from 1992 to 2008 in 26 European 
Union  countries.
1  Thus,  we  can  not  only  test  for  the  impact  of  political  and 
socioeconomic variables on RES-E development as done by Marques et al. (2010; 2011), 
but we can also assess the effectiveness of FIT policies specifically. Second, we use a 
fixed-effects panel data approach to control for unobserved state -level characteristics 
that may influence both policy implementation and renewable energy developmen t. 
Third, we develop a new statistical indicator for feed-in tariffs—similar to that developed 
by Yin and Powers (2009) for RPS—that accounts for policy design elements that may 
influence policy strength. 
3.1  Dependent variable selection 
A review of the literature reveals several possible dependent variables to represent RES-E 
development.  The  options  differ  along  two  dimensions:  (1)  whether  development 
includes nameplate capacity, actual generation, or total energy supply and (2) whether 
development is represented as a cumulative total, yearly change, or a ratio of renewable 
to conventional energy. 
In the first case, we use capacity instead of generation or supply to reflect the 
investment  decision  as  purely  as  possible.  Capacity  development  tracks  with  RES-E 
investment without being biased by forces the investor cannot foresee or control. While 
RES-E  generation  is  largely  determined  by  installed  capacity,  it  is  also  affected  by 
weather,  equipment  performance,  technical  problems,  and  other  factors.    In  other 
                                                       
1 The sample consists of 26 out of the 27 EU member states. We excluded Malta due to incomplete data.  
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words, generation determines the actual return on investment while capacity reflects the 
expected return on investment.  Since our goal is to examine links between FIT policies 
and the decision to invest in solar PV or wind installations (rather than the actual value 
derived from those installations), capacity is the most relevant metric.  
In the second case, we use annual added capacity.  Added capacity is preferable 
to the ratio of renewable electricity to total electricity capacity for two reasons.  First, 
while  feed-in  tariffs  are  designed  to  increase  RES-E  capacity,  they  are  not  explicitly 
designed to increase the share of RES-E relative to other electricity sources (unlike RPS 
policies, for example).  In other words, RES-E ratio is not technically a good metric for the 
“effectiveness” of a feed-in tariff.  Second, using a ratio introduces additional statistical 
variability that is not relevant to our analysis.  Other types of generation capacity may be 
added or lost due to forces unrelated to RES-E development.  
Added capacity is also preferable to cumulative capacity because we want the 
effect of a policy to be isolated from cumulative development of capacity before an 
investment is made.  A FIT contributes to the return on investment associated with an 
RES-E system installed in a given year.  The value added by the FIT is set for that year 
through the duration of the contract. Therefore, the investor makes his or her decision 
on the basis of this year’s FIT and this year’s cost, as well as anticipated future costs. FIT 
levels and capacity development in previous years are unlikely to affect the individual 
investor’s decision.  In order to measure the marginal effect of a FIT policy in a given 
year, the effect must be isolated from past trends.  The use of added capacity as the 
dependent variable fulfills this requirement.  This has the effect of controlling for trends 
in total capacity over time.  
Finally, we use technology-specific capacity data because FIT policies tend to be 
structured differently depending on the energy technology to which they apply.  We 
conduct separate regressions for solar PV and onshore wind, allowing us to estimate the 
effect of technology-specific FIT policies on technology-specific capacity development.  
With the exception of Menz and Vachon (2006) and Shrimali and Kneifel (2011), previous 
studies have used total RES-E data or the renewable energy share of total energy supply 
and therefore do not distinguish between the relative contribution of different energy 
technologies.  We obtained capacity data from the UN Energy Statistics Database (2011).    
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3.2  Assessing the strength of feed-in tariffs 
Behavioral  research  sheds  some  light  on  the  link  between  FIT  policies  and  RES-E 
development.  Burer and Wustenhagen (2009) surveyed European and North American 
venture capital investors to determine their preferred policy environment for investing.  
They  found  that  investors  prefer  feed-in  tariffs  above  any  other  policy  types,  largely 
because they reduce investment risk more than other policies.  Building on Held (2009), 
Masini and Menichetti (2010) also employ a survey to examine behavioral factors that 
influence investments in energy systems.  Their study demonstrates the key importance 
of clear policy signals in driving investment and finds that investors strongly favor feed-in 
tariffs over any other RES-E policy. In addition, they find that investors consider tariff size 
and contract duration of feed-in-tariffs almost equally important. While these authors 
take  a  qualitative  ex-ante  approach,  we  complement  and  verify  their  work  with  a 
quantitative  ex-post  approach.    They  ask  investors  to  what  extent  the  political  and 
market environment shapes investment decisions; we rigorously quantify and test the 
significance of those drivers in actual RES-E deployment. 
The investment incentive provided by feed-in tariffs varies significantly depending 
on how each policy is designed and the market in which it operates. Key factors are the 
size of the tariff paid to the electricity producer, wholesale electricity price, the length of 
a contract agreement under a tariff, and the cost of RES-E electricity production. In order 
to take these factors into account, we  developed  a new indicator for the  return-on-
investment  (ROI)  faced  by  a  potential  investor  in  RES-E.  For  energy  technology  i,  in 
country s, in year t, ROI is defined as: 
 
where FITist is the price received by a producer for electricity sold to the grid under a FIT 
contract (in Eurocents/kWh). For fixed-price tariffs, this is the amount of the tariff. For 
premium tariffs, this is the market price of electricity plus the bonus.  This value also 
takes into account digression rates where applicable—i.e. FITist is reduced depending on 
the number of years after policy enactment t occurs. CTist is the duration of a FIT contract 
(in years) established in year t. Pst is the wholesale electricity price (in Eurocents/kWh) in 
year  t.  While  the  tariff  size  is  fixed  for  the  duration  of  the  contract,  the  wholesale  
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electricity price is subject to fluctuation. Therefore, investors in RES-E capacity must deal 
with uncertainty in estimating future revenues. We assume that the investor will expect 
the  wholesale  electricity  price  to  remain  stable  at  Pst  over  the  lifetime  of  capacity 
installed in year t. LTit is the expected lifetime (in years) of a solar panel or wind turbine 
constructed in year t. ACOEist is the average cost of electricity production for capacity 
built in year t (in Eurocents/kWh). 
Intuitively, the indicator represents the return on investment associated with RES-
E capacity installed in year t.  The numerator represents total profit (revenue minus cost) 
received by a RES-E producer for generating one kWh per year over the lifetime of a 
panel or turbine installed under a FIT contract in year t.  During the FIT contract, the 
producer receives revenue of FITist. After the contract has expired, revenue drops to the 
wholesale  market  price  until  the  end  of  the  capacity’s  lifetime.  The  denominator 
represents the total lifetime cost of producing one kWh annually. Therefore, ROI is the 
ratio of profit to cost per kWh over the lifetime of capacity installed in year t. We assume 
constant capacity utilization across the entire panel.  For years in which no FIT policy has 
been enacted, CT = 0 and ROI represents the return on investment received by RES-E 
producers in the absence of a FIT.  Overall, ROI is a more nuanced indicator of the true 
investment incentive provided by a FIT, as compared to traditional binary policy variables 
that are simply “on” if a policy is in place and “off” if it is not. 
In order to isolate the effect of FIT policies from non-policy components of return 
on investment, we also split the ROI indicator into two pieces. ROI_1ist represents return 
on investment in the presence of a FIT policy.  This indicator is identical to the standard 
ROI indicator, except that it takes the value 0 for any country-years in which a FIT is not 




ROI_0ist is a second indicator that represents return on investment when no policy is 





Including these indicators allows us to separately analyze those country-years in which a 
FIT is and is not present within the same regression model.  The effect is to partially parse 
out policy-driven changes in ROI from those changes attributable to other factors. 
3.3  Data 
Constructing the ROI indicator requires us to assemble 1992-2008 data for each of its 
components.  For  both  solar  PV  and  onshore  wind,  we  gratefully  received  technical 
support from the Energy Economics Group at Vienna University of Technology. Their 
GreenX toolbox provided real policy data and real cost data for the time period from 
2006 to 2009 as well as projections for 2010 to 2020. The GreenX model has also been 
used  by  Fraunhofer  ISI  (Sensfuss  and  Ragwitz  2007),  the  European  Commission,  and 
others. If GreenX (EEG 2009a) did not sufficiently cover the necessary data, information 
from RES-Legal (2011), REN21 (2010), the IEA Policies and Measures Database (2011a), 
and Ragwitz et al. (2009; 2011) was used to close the gaps. Data on the average cost of 
electricity generation from solar PV and onshore wind was taken from Schilling (2009).
2 
In the majority of cases, FIT policies pay different tariffs to different technologies. 
While other studies have neglected this heterogeneity, this study accounts for the 
different levels of tariffs by focusing on two technologies separately. Still, the model 
cannot cover the complete continuum of heterogeneity in FIT policies. The majority of 
countries pay a fixed tariff per kWh to the producer of electricity from wind onshor e 
systems. Solar PV FIT schemes are more diverse, as tariff size varies with the size of the 
installation and its ownership. We follow GreenX by relying on the mean value of the PV 
tariff  across  all  size,  location  and  ownership  categories,  recognizing  that   some 
information is lost in order to gain feasibility. 
Especially in the years during the global financial crisis, many governments across 
the EU modified their FIT schemes by scaling down their size. Most strikingly, Spain 
                                                       
2  The  cost  data  from  GreenX  (EEG  2009a)  served  as  a  robustness  check.  There  have  not  been  major 
differences in the outcome. We decided in favor of the Schilling (2009) data because GreenX (EEG 2009a) 
did not provide cost data for a few years and countries. Further research may use the GreenX toolbox or 
similar packages to introduce further variation in the ROI indicator.   
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capped the FIT budget in 2008 and 2009, a change which was concurrent with reduced 
capacity  development  in  Spain  and  caused  at  least  15  investors  to  sue  the  Spanish 
government (Morales and Sills 2011). As shown in Table 2, seven other countries capped 
their FIT policies, allowing for early runs on FIT contracts early in the year while keeping 
annual  new  installations  under  control.  The  other  countries  simply  maintained  the 
digression rates that were already part of the FIT legislation. Ragwitz et al. (2009) provide 
an excellent summary of these policy changes.
3 
Figure 2 presents calculated ROI values for each country in our sample and 
compares them with annual added RES-E capacity of solar PV and wind onshore.  
 
Figure 2: Added capacity and ROI values for 26 EU member countries, 1992 to 2008 
 
                                                       
3We expect that we could not account for every change to FIT policies. Therefore, we welcome further 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4  Additional explanatory variables 
We  include  the  “incremental  percentage  requirement”  variable  (INCRQMTSHAREst), 
originally developed by Yin and Powers to assess the effectiveness of state-level RPS 
policies  in  the  U.S.  This  indicator  represents  “the  mandated  increase  in  renewable 
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The indicator calculates the difference between the policy-determined nominal share of 
RES-E required and the existing RES-E sales that are already eligible to meet the quota, 
while also taking into account the portion of capacity over which the RPS has jurisdiction. 
The ratio of the required/existing gap to the total annual electricity sales covered by the 
quota yields the incremental percentage requirement. We calculated this indicator for 
the EU countries that employ a quota system. In 2009, Sweden had the strongest quota 
policy with an ICRQMTSHARE of 14.6%. Other countries, such as Poland and Belgium, 
have indicators close to zero, implying that that their quotas are close to being attained 
and are unlikely to provide much pressure for additional RES-E generation capacity. 
As has been outlined above, tax credits and investment loans are price-driven 
policies to promote investment in RES-E. Tendering schemes are quantity regulations also 
supporting RES-E. We control for these policies by incorporating binary codes that equal 
1 if a policy is in place and 0 if it is not.  
The remaining control variables are taken from the literature and are outlined in 
Table 4. Marques et al. (2011) provide the most sophisticated analysis of socioeconomic 
variables driving RES-E development in Europe to date. Unlike many previous studies, 
they  include  controls  for  GDP  and  the  relative  contribution  of  conventional  energy 
sources to the overall fuel mix. In order to produce comparable results, we apply the 
controls used by Marques et al. (2011).  
Carley (2009) illustrates the importance of controlling for GDP per capita, finding that is 
has a strong positive impact on RES-E generation. Also following Shrimali and Kneifel 
(2010), we expect higher GDP per capita to support development of RES-E.  We expect 
that wealthier countries will possess to a greater degree the technological expertise, 
infrastructure, and risk tolerance to invest in more expensive RES-E technologies.   
We also expect the total land area of a country to have a positive impact on deployment 
of  RES-E.    Larger  countries  will,  on  average,  contain  more  suitable  land  for  RES-E 
installations.  Following Marques et al. (2010; 2011), we incorporate this variable into our 
cross-sectional regressions, though it is dropped from fixed-effects regressions because it 




Table 4: Controls specification 
Name  Description  Unit  Source  Also used by 
Nuclear 
share 
Natural logarithm of nuclear to total 




Marques et al. (2010; 
2011) 
Oil share 
Natural logarithm of  diesel and crude 








Natural logarithm of natural gas to 




Marques et al. (2010; 
2011) 
Coal share 
Natural logarithm of  coal and lignite 
















Marques et al. (2010; 
2011), Shrimali and 
Kneifel (2011) 
Area  Land area size  1000 ha 
Faostat 
(2011) 




Natural logarithm of  net electricity 




Yin and Powers 
(2009), Marques et 
al. (2010; 2011) 
Energy 
consumptio
n per capita 
Natural logarithm of primary energy 



















Marques et al. (2010; 
2011) 
 
Yin and Powers (2009) point out the importance of energy dependency as a driver 
of RES-E development.  As global reserves of conventional energy sources decline and 
emerging  economies  rapidly  increase  their  energy  demand,  incentivizing  RES-E 
development  represents  an  increasingly  common  strategy  for  Western  countries  to 
improve their energy independence. Therefore, we expect a positive link between a high 
share of net imported electricity and RES-E development. A similar rationale suggests 
that  RES-E  capacity  will  develop  more  rapidly  in  countries  with  high  primary  energy 
consumption. Marques (2010; 2011) find a significant positive connection between the 
per capita consumption of energy and the share of renewable energy relative to total 
energy supply. We include the same variable to verify the connection.  
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Finally, EU 2001 is a time binary dummy differentiating the years before and after 
the  European  Commission  first  ratified  a  binding  RES-E  directive.
4  The  Directive 
2001/EC/77 provides a legally enforceable  commitment for the EU member states to 
implement RES-E support policies.  Policy responses to the Directive have ranged from 
strong to negligible, but each member country has passed some RES -E legislation as a 
result.  This variable capture s any systematic changes in the responsiveness of RES -E 
development to drivers before and after the Directive was ratified. 
3.5  Model specification 
We assemble historical 1992-2008 panel data for the variables discussed above. We then 
analyze  this  data  within  a  country-level  fixed-effects  regression  model  to  assess  the 
effect  of  FIT  policies  on  wind  and  PV  capacity  development.  As  Shrimali  and  Kneifel 
(2011)  note,  fixed  effects  control  for  any  country-level  characteristics  that  remain 
constant over time—including potential for RES-E (e.g. solar insolation and windiness), 
land  area,  capacity  construction  before  1992,  and  time-invariant  environmental 
preferences.
5  For energy technology i, in country s, in year t, our main regression model 
is: 
(1)   
 
where Added Capacityist is the additional RES-E generation capacity installed between 
years  t-1  and  t  for  energy  technology  i  (solar  PV  or  onshore  wind);  ROIist  is  our 
technology-specific indicator for FIT strength; INCRQMTSHAREst is the indicator for RPS 
strength  developed  in  Yin  and  Powers  (2009);  Zist  is  a  suite  of  binary  variables  that 
represent other policies designed to encourage RES-E development; Wist is a suite of 
social and economic variables expected to have an impact on RES-E development; µs 
represents country-level fixed effects; and uist is an error term.  In some regressions, we 
exchange ROIist for ROI_1ist and ROI_0ist. 
                                                       
4 For years after the ratification of the Directive, the binary code is “on” only if a country was an EU 
member at that time. 
5 A Hausman test rejects the hypothesis of no unit heterogeneity , confirming the need to control for 
unobserved differences between states.  
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We first run preliminary regressions to establish the baseline relationship between added 
RES-E capacity and policy variables for both wind and PV. The first is a pooled cross-
section regression that does not control for country-level fixed effects and the second is a 
fixed-effects regression that employs conventional binary policy variables only.  We then 
run a series of regressions using the model given in Equation (1).  
4  Results 
Table 5 displays the results of our preliminary pooled cross-section regressions.  These 
regressions  reveal  a  large,  positive,  and  highly  significant  relationship  between  FIT 
policies and RES-E development.  This is observed across both technology types and both 
policy variables (binary and ROI).  As shown in regressions (1) and (4), a country with a FIT 
in place will install 57% more PV capacity or 120% more onshore wind capacity per year 
than a country with no FIT. As shown in (2) and (5), a 10 percentage point increase in the 
ROI provided by a FIT policy is associated with an increase in annual capacity added of 
8.1% for PV and 7.1% for wind.
6 However, the link between policy and capacity revealed 
by a pooled cross-section regression cannot be interpreted as causal because omitted 
variables (such as country characteristics) may bias the coefficients. 
Table  6  presents the results from several estimations of our main regression 
model given in Equation (1). The specifications provided here are identical to those in 
Table 5 except that we now employ state -level fixed effects to control for unobserved 
state characteristics that are static over time. Across both tech nology types and all 






                                                       
6 In other words, a one unit increase in the ROI indicator (i.e. an increase of 100 percentage points) would 
be associated with an increase in annual capacity added of 81% for PV and 71% for wind.  However, we use 
a 10 percentage point increase in ROI for illustrative purposes because it is a more realistic example of ROI 
changes that may actually occur on a year to year basis.  
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Table 5: Pooled cross-section OLS regression results 
  Solar Photovoltaic  Onshore Wind 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Binary FIT  0.566***        1.202***       
(0.109)        (0.188)       
ROI     0.810***        0.710***    
     (0.101)        (0.163)    
ROI_1        1.075***        0.414** 
      (0.147)        (0.186) 
ROI_0        0.286***        1.494*** 
      (0.090)        (0.226) 
INCRMTSHARE  -2.873  0.540  0.437  14.663***  3.230  -2.841 
(2.768)  (2.150)  (2.190)  (4.727)  (5.107)  (5.714) 
Binary Tax or Grant  -0.106  0.117  0.151  -0.010  -0.648**  -0.709** 
(0.130)  (0.121)  (0.125)  (0.278)  (0.301)  (0.286) 
Binary Tendering Scheme  -0.422***  0.044  -0.006  0.404  0.133  0.358 
(0.161)  (0.131)  (0.135)  (0.283)  (0.283)  (0.278) 
Binary EU 2001  -0.110  0.068  0.106  0.083  0.262  0.175 
(0.261)  (0.216)  (0.204)  (0.376)  (0.367)  (0.355) 
GDP p.C., ln  0.672***  0.067  0.263***  2.351***  2.346***  2.068*** 
(0.134)  (0.103)  (0.093)  (0.236)  (0.237)  (0.231) 
Energy Consumption p.C., ln  0.035  0.226  -0.027  -0.708**  -0.228  0.016 
(0.166)  (0.150)  (0.149)  (0.361)  (0.364)  (0.368) 
Area, ln  0.339***  0.245***  0.213***  0.842***  0.943***  0.900*** 
(0.056)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.079)  (0.074)  (0.075) 
Energy Net Import Ratio, ln  -0.054***  0.004  0.016  -0.011  -0.044  -0.027 
(0.020)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Share of Elec. from Nuclear, ln  0.049*  0.038*  0.034  -0.017  -0.057  -0.042 
(0.025)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.042) 
Share of Elec. from Oil, ln  0.019  0.066  0.039  0.146*  0.264***  0.303*** 
(0.045)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.084)  (0.087)  (0.088) 
Share of Elec. from Nat. Gas, ln  0.132***  0.131***  0.147***  0.356***  0.315***  0.285*** 
(0.039)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.067)  (0.064)  (0.064) 
Share of Elec. from Coal, ln  0.017  0.007  0.016  0.202***  0.210***  0.223*** 
(0.029)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.056) 
N  440  440  440  440  440  440 
R2  0.309  0.503  0.536  0.614  0.611  0.625 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  natural  log  of  annual  solar  PV  or 















Table 6: Fixed effects regression results 
  Solar Photovoltaic  Onshore Wind 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Binary FIT  0.054        0.486**       
(0.136)        (0.199)       
ROI     0.592***        0.436***    
     (0.082)        (0.121)    
ROI_1        0.818***        0.221* 
      (0.097)        (0.129) 
ROI_0        0.119        1.278*** 
      (0.139)        (0.231) 
INCRMTSHARE  4.910  4.317  3.120  7.008  4.405  -2.294 
(4.100)  (3.839)  (3.774)  (6.094)  (5.996)  (6.080) 
Binary Tax or Grant  0.194  0.190  0.195  0.646*  0.404  0.303 
(0.224)  (0.211)  (0.207)  (0.332)  (0.336)  (0.330) 
Binary Tendering Scheme  -0.002  -0.021  -0.060  -0.380  -0.409  -0.355 
(0.202)  (0.190)  (0.186)  (0.299)  (0.296)  (0.290) 
Binary EU 2001  -0.137  0.055  0.085  0.002  0.113  0.075 
(0.212)  (0.201)  (0.197)  (0.314)  (0.314)  (0.307) 
GDP p.C., ln  -0.567  -0.879**  -0.268  1.640***  1.084  0.357 
(0.424)  (0.390)  (0.409)  (0.634)  (0.664)  (0.672) 
Energy Consumption p.C., ln  1.139*  0.568  0.610  1.486  1.820*  1.714* 
  (0.693)  (0.652)  (0.640)  (1.024)  (1.011)  (0.990) 
Energy Net Import Ratio, ln  0.031  -0.008  0.003  0.116*  0.077  0.086 
(0.040)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.060)  (0.061)  (0.060) 
Share of Elec. from Nuclear, ln  -0.234  -0.334*  -0.361**  0.082  0.088  0.065 
(0.193)  (0.182)  (0.179)  (0.287)  (0.284)  (0.278) 
Share of Elec. from Oil, ln  -0.285**  -0.170  -0.190  0.057  0.190  0.265 
(0.133)  (0.125)  (0.123)  (0.196)  (0.198)  (0.195) 
Share of Elec. from Nat. Gas, ln  0.445***  0.264**  0.197*  1.116***  1.136***  1.151*** 
(0.111)  (0.107)  (0.106)  (0.164)  (0.163)  (0.159) 
Share of Elec. from Coal, ln  -0.338  -0.417*  -0.377  0.205  0.338  0.323 
(0.252)  (0.237)  (0.232)  (0.373)  (0.372)  (0.364) 
N  440  440  440  440  440  440 
R2  0.153  0.251  0.282  0.381  0.392  0.418 
Standard errors in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the natural log  of annual solar PV or 
onshore wind capacity added (in MW).  * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. 
 
However, the fixed-effects regression results indicate that feed-in tariffs have driven solar PV and 
onshore wind development in Europe since 1992, even when fixed country characteristics are 
controlled.  Specifically, regressions (2) and (5) of Table 6 indicate that for a 10 percentage point 
increase  in  ROI,  countries  will  install  5.9%  more  PV  capacity  and  4.3%  more  onshore  wind 
capacity per year on average.  Regressions (3) and (6) confirm that ROI is a significant driver of 
capacity development in country-years with a FIT.  However, in country-years without a FIT, ROI 
appears to drive development of wind power but not PV. 
Both the magnitude and significance of coefficients vary dramatically between regressions (1) 
and (2) and slightly between regressions (4) and (5), implying that policy design features are an 
important control.  In the case of PV, the FIT coefficient is much smaller and insignificant when a 
simple binary policy variable is used in (1).  This suggests that there is a genuine relationship  
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between policy and solar PV development that is masked without taking into account the unique 
design of each FIT. 
Several  control  variables  in  the  fixed-effects  regression  are  significant  determinants  of  RES-E 
capacity development as well.  However, only the coefficient on share of electricity from natural 
gas remains positive and significant throughout the six regressions. These results are discussed in 
more detail in the following section. 
5  Discussion 
5.1  Interpretation of findings 
The results of this analysis confirm the general conclusion in the literature that feed-in tariffs 
have driven RES-E capacity development in Europe, especially for solar PV.  A key question for 
policymakers is whether FIT policies increase RES-E development beyond the rate at which it 
would have developed otherwise.  In other words, do the policies have a marginal impact on 
capacity, or do countries incur public expense to subsidize only inframarginal development that 
would have happened anyway?  Our panel-driven fixed-effects approach verifies that FIT policies 
have contributed some marginal impact by providing a true production incentive, though the 
results are not sufficient to make claims about the portion of each tariff that provides marginal 
vs. inframarginal incentive.  
Our  results  also  reinforce  the  importance  of  incorporating  information  about  unique 
policy  design  elements  into  econometric  analysis  of  RES-E  policies.    Including  a  statistical 
representation of return on investment into our regressions, rather than relying on traditional 
binary policy variables, produces dramatically different results.  In the case of solar PV, the link 
between FIT policies and RES-E development is insignificant when using a binary indicator and 
significant at less than 1% when using ROI. The implication of this result is that specific policy 
design and market characteristics matter more than the presence of a policy alone in determining 
RES-E development.  In other words, not all feed-in tariffs are created equal, and policy design 
matters. FIT policies do not increase solar PV capacity development simply by virtue of being 
enacted,  but  it  can  be  shown  that  the  higher  true  ROI  they  provide  to  investors,  the  more 
capacity will be installed on average.  This insight is informative in a world of political discourse 
that is often more focused on the morality of a policy type than on the intricacies of its specific 
design. 
Comparing ROI_1 and ROI_0 in regression (3) confirms a common theme in energy policy 
debates in Europe: without a FIT, solar PV development would not be driven by the return on  
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investment provided by the market alone.  This regression provides an important robustness 
check to ensure that the coefficient on ROI in regression (2) is not driven only or primarily by ROI 
in  country-years  where  no  FIT  is  in  place.    When  a  FIT  is  introduced,  the  impact  of  a  10 
percentage point increase in ROI jumps from an insignificant 1.2% (ROI_0) to an 8.2% (ROI_1) 
that is significant at the 1% level.  Note that this does not necessarily imply that a low ROI 
prevented  PV  development;  it  implies  that  there  is  no  statistically  significant  link  between 
development and market ROI at all.  This may be because, in country-years with no FIT, ROI for 
PV is low and therefore deployment is driven by other factors such as culture or environmental 
concerns (most of which will be controlled by fixed effects).  In country-years with a FIT, ROI 
alone is a large enough decision-making factor for investors that it provides incentive for PV 
deployment beyond that provided by these other factors.   
These results change when we turn to onshore wind.  Because wind is a more mature 
technology with lower generation costs than solar PV, ROI provides a strong incentive for wind 
development  even  in  country-years  without  policy  support.  Regression  (6)  shows  that  a  10 
percentage point increase in ROI_0 would increase installed wind capacity by 12.8% per year.  In 
other  words,  investment  returns  are  a  significant  decision-making  factor  for  investors  even 
without the support of a FIT. The relationship between policy and development in country-years 
with a FIT is positive and significant, but it is curiously about six times smaller in magnitude than 
in country-years with no FIT.  This may imply that FIT policies for wind are largely redundant—i.e. 
that the additional ROI they provide is not a large determinant of wind power development.  
However, this may also be due to the statistical limitations of the ROI_1 and ROI_0 indicators.  
For about half of the countries in our sample, annual wind capacity installations peaked and then 
declined (sometimes dramatically) in the years leading up to 2008.  During those years, most 
countries also had some form of FIT for wind, so the FIT_0 indicator was forced to take the value 
0 while ROI_1 remained high.  This may have led to an overestimation of the coefficient on ROI_0 
and an underestimation of that on ROI_1.  A more sophisticated effort to parse out policy-driven 
ROI from market ROI may be required to resolve this issue.  For now, the results in regressions 
(4)-(6)  appear  sufficient  to  confirm  at  least  some  link  between  FIT  policies  and  wind 
development.  
Our analysis of FIT policies follows a pattern similar to that of the three groups of RPS 
literature  discussed  in  Section  2.    Like  the  first  group,  we  see  a  large,  positive,  and  highly 
significant  link  between  policy  and  development  when  using  a  pooled  cross-section  model.  
However, this effect can be both intuitively assumed and statistically shown to be overstated 
because  it  is  biased  by  unobserved  country  characteristics  that  influence  both  policy  and  
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development.  When we include controls for fixed effects per the second group of studies, this 
apparent link is dramatically reduced (for wind) or becomes statistically insignificant (for PV).  
Finally, when we employ a more nuanced indicator that reflects the true incentive provided by a 
FIT—as Yin and Powers (2009) did for RPS in the U.S.—we reestablish a link between policy and 
development. We hope that these results will motivate careful consideration of controls and 
policy design in future RES-E policy analysis. 
Our analysis does not provide robust evidence that non-FIT RES-E policies have increased 
capacity development. This verifies the findings from Masini and Menichetti (2010) and other 
survey-based studies that we discussed in subsection 3.2. 
Other  than  the  share  of  electricity  from  natural  gas,  most  of  our  economic  control 
variables were not shown to be significant determinants of RES-E development. Natural gas share 
appears to have a significant positive impact on both wind and PV capacity development in all our 
OLS and fixed-effect regressions. The “Golden Age of Gas” (IEA 2011b) seems to be partly driven 
by the ability of natural gas plants to balance the intermittency of RES-E generation sources that 
are subject to day/night cycles and weather. Electricity generation from burning natural gas is 
roughly  half  as  carbon  dioxide  intensive  as  the  equivalent  in  coal-fired  generation,  and  it 
performs even better with Nitrogen, Sulfur and Mercury emissions. With these benefits, natural 
gas  is  an  attractive  candidate  to  supplement  RES-E  generation  for  both  logistical  and 
environmental reaaons. 
Our results do not confirm Yin and Powers (2009) finding that the ratio of net imports of 
electricity  to  domestically  produced  electricity  is  a  significant  and  positive  driver  of  RES-E 
development.  They also do not confirm the assertion by Marques et al. that there is a slight 
underlying influence  of per capita energy consumption on RES-E development.   Because our 
fixed-effects  model  drops  variables  that  are  constant  over  time,  we  could  not  verify  the 
significant, positive effect of land area on RES-E deployment that was demonstrated by the FEVD 
model in Marques et al. (2010). However, our pooled cross-section regressions do indicate a 
strong relationship between land area and RES-E development. 
5.2  A more nuanced ROI indicator 
The ROI indicator we employed for our empirical investigation is a fine-grained metric to 
assess the real strength of a FIT. In fact, it reveals a link between FIT policies and RES-E 
development that would have been masked using a traditional binary policy variable. ROI 
does not incorporate all relevant variables that help determine the investment incentive  
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created by a FIT, but it can serve as a stepping-stone to develop a more informative and 
comprehensive  theoretical  indicator  that  incorporates  factors  we  cannot  currently 
measure empirically. 
Stimulating  investment  with  FIT  policies  is  a  complex  matter,  and  it  is  important  to 
understand that some additional factors contribute to the uniqueness of each policy and 
the market it affects.  Investment is not done in a social and economic vacuum under 
perfect market conditions, but in a dynamic environment of uncertainties and bounded 
rationality of its actors (Simon 1957). Investment decisions are embedded in a socio-
economic reality that is shaped by interactions and dynamics we cannot quantify at this 
point. What we can do, however, is to further elaborate on our ROI indicator and use it 
as a theoretical tool to better understand some of these more amorphous factors.   
This  expanded  indicator,  which  we  will  call  ROI_U  because  it  incorporates 
elements of uncertainty, may take the following form, for energy technology i, in country 




As  discussed  in  Masini  and  Menichetti  (2010),  there  are  three  sources  of  ex-ante 
uncertainty that may influence investment decisions.  
The first has to do with technology. Risk concerning RES-E technology’s current 
efficiency and future cost development will impact the investment choice as well as the 
timing  of  investment.    To  account  for  technological  uncertainty,  we  expand  ROI  by 
incorporating the purely theoretical parameter  . It primarily affects fixed upfront costs 
faced  by  RES-E  investors.  As  has  been  pointed  out  by  Nemet  (2006)  and  others, 
technologies become more cost-efficient over time. Since successful innovations have a 
heavily  left-tailed  distribution  and  are  hard  to  predict,  investors  will  experience 
additional  uncertainty  in  making  long-term  investments  in  high-technology  products. 
Therefore, we assume   has a positive impact on expected future costs which yields a 
negative  impact  on  current  investment  incentive,  such  that  .  The  
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conservative  investor  may  shift  investment  to  the  future  if  he  expects  a  divergence 
caused by  costs decreasing faster  than the  tariff  digresses ( .  If 
policymakers seem more likely to reduce or eliminate tariffs in the future, investment in 
the present will look more attractive. 
The second involves uncertainty surrounding the market at large. In ROI_U, we represent 
spot market uncertainty with  . Premium tariffs are paid as a bonus to the spot market 
price, and RES-E producers will received the market price for any electricity generated 
after a tariff contract has expired. Therefore, the expected return on investment largely 
depends on this price. Since fluctuations are inevitable and the general trend of price 
development  is  unclear  even  (or  especially)  to  researchers,  investors  add  another 
element of uncertainty to their calculus. Since uncertainty decreases attractiveness in the 
long-run,  we  assume    for  risk-averse  investors.  Price  uncertainty 
decreases ROI_U to a greater degree when it is combined with short contract durations, 
as the capacity will be operating for more of its lifetime without the added benefit of a 
tariff and will be more reliant on market price for revenue. The years that occur during 
the  capacity’s  lifetime  (LT)  but  after  the  contract  duration  (CT)  has  ended  will  add 
vulnerability of   for the investor. 
The  political  environment  is  a  third  source  of  uncertainty  for  the  investor.  In 
ROI_U,   represents the degree of political uncertainty surrounding the FIT policy. We 
expect  , which means that an increase in political instability or a loss of 
political reliability adds doubt to the expected return on investment of RES-E capacity. If 
a  FIT  can  be  repealed  or  revised,  investors  are  more  reluctant  to  direct  capital  into 
projects that rely on the FIT for good returns. In most cases, the contractor is legally 
entitled to receive a fixed tariff. However, the example of Spain shows that legislators 
may violate this long-term commitment in times of short-term economic turmoil, thus 
putting the expected return on investment at risk. 
Finally, the term   represents the portion of the electricity price that is added 
because the FIT redistributes money between end-users in order to finance the FIT.  In 
some cases, the price of the tariff is allocated to end-users by increasing the price of 
electricity generated from conventional sources. The more heavily RES-E is subsidized by 
a FIT, the more money is added to the pre-FIT market price, which in turn leads to an  
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increase in ROI_U, such that   In other words, the FIT can be a self-
reinforcing mechanism to promote RES-E while the end-users or the state budget bear 
the cost.  
The  elements  of  uncertainty  included  in  ROI_U  are  difficult  to  represent 
empirically.  However, there may be opportunities to use proxy data, survey results, or 
other strategies to characterize them in future studies. In the meantime, ROI_U serves as 
a useful theoretical tool for thinking about how future uncertainty and risk affect RES-E 
investment decisions today. 
5.3  Conclusion 
This  paper  provides  the  first  rigorous  econometric  analysis  of  feed-in  tariff  policy 
effectiveness in Europe. Previous analyses of RES-E policies in general have often taken a 
blunt approach, using cross-sectional models or ignoring differences in policy design. 
  In this paper, we employ a fixed-effects regression model to control for country-
level characteristics.  We also introduce a new measure of policy strength that represents 
the return on investment provided by feed-in tariffs.  We find that FIT policies have 
driven solar photovoltaic and onshore wind power capacity development in Europe since 
1992.    We  verify  that  fixed  country-level  characteristics  will  bias  the  results  if  not 
controlled, and we show that accounting for the unique design of each FIT often reveals a 
link between policy and RES-E development that is otherwise obscured. 
  These results imply that the design of each policy and the market it affects are more 
important determinants of RES-E development than the enactment of a policy alone.  
This should prove informative to both researchers and policymakers.  In future analyses, 
we  hope  to  (1)  more  rigorously  characterize  the  uncertainty  surrounding  policy  and 
market conditions and (2) analyze the relative impact of each policy design element on 
RES-E  development.  This  may  provide  insight  into  strategies  for  optimizing  FIT 
performance.  




Table A1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Added Capacity PV  442  21.52  170.03  -38.00  2586.00 
Added Capacity Wind  442  144.04  426.54  -352.00  3247.00 
ROI, PV  442  -0.35  0.92  -0.96  2.93 
ROI_1, PV  442  0.19  0.65  -0.96  2.93 
ROI_0, PV  442  -0.55  0.45  -0.96  0.78 
ROI, Wind  442  -0.07  0.81  -0.80  4.85 
ROI_1, Wind  442  0.21  0.61  -0.80  4.85 
ROI_0, Wind  442  -0.28  0.41  -0.80  1.53 
INCRMTSHARE  442  0.00  0.01  -0.02  0.14 
Binary Tax or Grant  442  0.10  0.29  0  1 
Binary Tendering Scheme  442  0.11  0.31  0  1 
Binary EU 2001  442  0.04  0.19  0  1 
GDP p.C.  442  22889.20  11422.75  5867.64  74421.63 
Energy Consumption p.C.  440  159.59  68.40  61.92  432.58 
Area  442  16080.04  15560.07  259.00  54766.00 
Energy Net Import Ratio  442  -14.90  75.74  -737.75  69.16 
Share of Electricity from Nuclear  442  21.84  24.59  0  86.82 
Share of Electricity from Oil  442  9.80  19.98  0  100 
Share of Electricity from Natural Gas  442  17.45  17.25  0  76.33 
















Table A2: Correlation Matrix 
 
Tax/ 
Grant   Tender  ROI, pv  ROI, wind ROI_1, PV  ROI_0, PV 
ROI_1, 
Wind 
Binary for Tax or Grant  1.00 
            Binary for Tendering Scheme  0.18  1.00 
          ROI, pv  -0.11  -0.14  1.00 
        ROI, wind  0.25  -0.01  0.53  1.00 
      ROI_1, PV  -0.12  -0.10  0.89  0.28  1.00 
    ROI_0, PV  -0.06  -0.13  0.75  0.67  0.36  1.00 
  ROI_1, Wind  0.22  0.05  0.35  0.87  0.21  0.41  1.00 
ROI_0, Wind  0.15  -0.10  0.52  0.68  0.23  0.72  0.23 
INCRMTSHARE  -0.03  -0.05  -0.03  0.09  -0.02  -0.04  -0.05 
Binary EU 2001  0.02  0.08  0.00  -0.04  -0.02  0.03  -0.07 
GDP p.C., ln  0.10  0.24  0.43  0.32  0.33  0.40  0.18 
Energy Consumption pC., ln   0.16  0.23  0.24  0.15  0.22  0.17  0.10 
Area, ln  0.02  0.10  0.02  -0.08  0.06  -0.05  -0.13 
Energy Net Import Ratio, ln   0.01  -0.09  -0.20  -0.02  -0.22  -0.10  0.03 
Share of Electricity from Nuclear, ln  0.01  0.03  -0.04  -0.01  0.04  -0.13  0.03 
Share of Electricity from Oil, ln  -0.15  0.00  -0.15  -0.24  -0.15  -0.09  -0.17 
Share of Electricity from Nat. Gas, ln  0.06  0.16  0.19  0.24  0.11  0.23  0.15 










ln   Area, ln 
Net Imp. 
R., ln  
ROI_0, Wind  1.00 
            INCRMTSHARE  0.26  1.00 
          Binary EU 2001  0.03  -0.04  1.00 
        GDP p.C., ln  0.36  0.09  0.11  1.00 
      Energy Consumption pC., ln   0.14  0.09  0.08  0.78  1.00 
    Area, ln  0.04  0.18  0.03  -0.16  -0.26  1.00 
  Energy Net Import Ratio, ln   -0.09  0.09  0.01  -0.05  -0.09  0.27  1.00 
Share of Electricity from Nuclear, ln  -0.07  0.10  0.00  -0.10  0.16  0.31  0.05 
Share of Electricity from Oil, ln  -0.21  -0.10  0.00  -0.13  -0.42  -0.03  0.26 
Share of Electricity from Nat. Gas, ln  0.26  -0.12  0.07  0.29  0.17  -0.07  -0.15 











   
 
Share of Electricity from Nuclear, ln  1.00 
            Share of Electricity from Oil, ln  -0.39  1.00 
          Share of Electricity from Nat. Gas, ln  -0.17  -0.14  1.00 
        Share of Electricity from Coal, ln  -0.02  -0.14  0.05  1.00 
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